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Abstract 
 
Despite being the focus of directed management for decades, marine fisheries around the world 
are in decline. We surveyed the literature to evaluate the efficacy of small-scale fishery 
cooperatives in managing common-pool fishery resources, and to identify the prevailing 
challenges to cooperative formation and operation, and the critical design elements for successful 
cooperatives. Collective management of common-pool fishery resources by users organized into 
cooperatives can result not only in sustainable resource use and enhanced socioeconomic 
benefits, but also in ecosystem conservation and stewardship. The effectiveness of fishery 
cooperatives depends on a variety of factors that are discussed in the paper. In addition, there 
must be measures for aligning the cooperative members’ interests with long-term sustainability, 
including the presence of secure fishing rights.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Small-scale fishermen need to find ways to rebuild depleted fish populations and sustain 
healthy ones in order to maintain their livelihoods, and fishery cooperatives offer promising 
solutions. In capture-fishery cooperatives, fishermen can become empowered to influence 
decision-making on the management of the resources that they rely on. They also benefit from 
economies of scale when purchasing fishing equipment, and gain power in negotiating fish prices 
(FAO, 2009). Under some conditions, joint fisheries management between cooperatives and 
government also facilitates the establishment of measures to protect the sustainability of fishing 
resources, such as the establishment of marine protected areas (e.g., Pomeroy and Beck, 1999; 
Ovando et al, 2013).  
In a review of small-scale fishery cooperatives worldwide, Pollnac (1988) identified 
attributes that were important in determining the success or failure of cooperatives in meeting 
their objectives (Table 1). In a study of 48 fishery cooperatives throughout coastal Ecuador, 
Poggie et al. (1988) found that the presence of cooperative facilities (running water, sanitation 
systems, lights, television, and fish storage equipment) and social solidarity (members carrying 
out obligations, good relations among members) were correlated with the perceived performance 
of cooperatives among their members.  
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Table 1: Attributes of success or failure of small-scale fishery cooperatives, classified by 
category (adapted from Pollnac, 1988). 
 
Category Attributes 
 
Cooperative origins and background 
 
 
 
 
1. Local initiative: Organizations formed on 
the basis of local initiatives are more likely 
to succeed1 
 
2. Early interest by fishermen: A vested 
interest by fishermen, in the form of an early 
investment in capital or labor, provides an 
incentive to work harder to achieve success. 
 
3. Foundation in traditional organizations: 
Fishery organizations that emerge from 
preexisting organizations are more likely to 
succeed.  
 
4. Past experience: Previous negative 
experiences of fishermen with fishery 
organizations are predictors of failure.  
 
5. Organization structure: Using successful 
local models as templates increases the 
likelihood of success. 
 
6. Legislation: Complex regulations can impair 
cooperative registration and access to loans 
and tax concessions. 
 
7. Training needs: Educating government 
extension agents and cooperative leaders on 
the potential benefits of cooperatives 
facilitates increased membership in 
cooperatives.  
8. Legislative support: Legislation assigning 
property rights to fishermen organizations 
has contributed to their success. 
 
9. Vested interests: Groups who feel negatively 
                                                             
1
 However, local initiative has been seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for success. For example, Jentoft 
and Sandersen (1996) noted the failure of many fishing cooperatives that were formed through local initiatives. In 
addition, many successful community initiatives have received external support from their inception, including 
supporting legislation from the government and financial assistance from external organizations (Jentoft et al., 
2011). 
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affected by the establishment of a cooperative 
can employ methods (including applying 
political pressure) to undermine the 
cooperative. 
 
Membership 
 
1. Group size: New cooperatives should be 
designed to be the size of existing successful 
organizations. Traditional patterns of social 
interactions dictate the optimum size of an 
organization. 
 
2. Members: Success will ultimately depend on 
members being willing to perform their 
duties. One way to maintain member 
reliability is to recruit only people with close 
ties to the fishery as members. 
 
3. Homogeneity of members: Cooperatives 
whose members have similar goals and 
values are more likely to succeed.   
 
Administration 
 
1. Management expertise: There are a large 
number of examples worldwide of 
fishermen organizations failing due to 
inadequate management skills. The ability to 
manage their own organization requires 
skills that fishermen may not have, and often 
there is resistance to having “outsiders” 
managing the organizations. 
 
2. Complexity: As organizations grow, they 
tend to assume more tasks and to become 
more complex and difficult to manage. 
Managers should take steps to prevent this 
complexity from threatening success.   
 
3. Participation: In successful cooperatives, 
there is strong participation by cooperative 
members in management decisions. The 
ability and willingness of fishermen to 
participate in meetings is essential. 
 
4. Interagency cooperation: Several 
government agencies are frequently 
involved in the development and 
maintenance of fishermen organizations, and 
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excessive bureaucratic procedures can 
impair organizational performance. 
Coordination among agencies can reduce the 
bureaucratic burden. 
 
Socioeconomic factors 
 
Availability of capital: The lack of capital 
has often impeded the establishment of 
cooperatives, but dependence on 
government subsidies as a financial source 
has contributed to failure. The perception of 
fishermen organizations as opportunities for 
investment instead as exclusively potential 
credit sources strengthens organizations. 
 
Compliance with rules 
 
Evasion of rules, such as fishing in no-take 
areas and selling fishery products outside of 
the cooperative, undermine trust and can 
lead to failure.  
 
 
 
In this study, we surveyed the literature to identify additional attributes that were 
identified by authors as leading to the success or failure of small-scale fishery cooperatives. The 
goal of this study was to address the existing information gap on common factors of success for 
fisheries cooperation (discussed in Ovando et al., 2013) by incorporating studies conducted after 
Pollnac (1988), considering the renewed interest on fishery cooperatives as part of the solution in 
coastal-resource management (Jentoft et al., 2011). 
 
 
Methods 
 
We searched the bibliographical database Web of Science (Thomson Reuters) for journal 
articles that contained information on factors that have contributed to, or have impeded, the 
success of small-scale fishery cooperatives. We used the truncated search terms Fishery* and 
Cooperative* in the search field “Topic”, and we limited our search from 1989 to the present (to 
identify articles posterior to Pollnac, 1988). From the number of articles found in the literature 
search (211), we selected those whose Abstract contained information on the authors’ perception 
on the success or failure of cooperatives in achieving their ecological, social, and/or economic 
objectives. Given the difficulty in uniquely defining small and large-scale fisheries because of 
differences in fisheries technology among countries (FAO, 2012), we used the classifications 
provided by the authors of the different studies. We classified fisheries that were described as 
“industrial” in the large-scale category. For the different cooperatives, we identified the factors 
that were perceived by the authors to lead to success or failure, a well as the ecological, social, 
and economic benefits resulting from cooperation. 
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Results 
 
We found 21 studies on 20 fishery cooperatives that met the search parameters discussed 
(Table 2); 18 of the cooperatives were in small-scale fisheries, as defined above. There was a 
wide geographical representation: Central and North America (9), Indo-Pacific (7), Caribbean 
(3), Europe (2), and Asia (1). A broad range of benefits resulted from the establishment of the 
cooperatives (Table 2), and the presence (or absence) of secure fishing rights was reported to 
influence success (or failure) in 18 out of the 20 studies. Attributes related to the success or 
failure of fishery cooperatives, collected from the literature posterior to Pollnac (1988), are listed 
in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Ecological, social, and economic benefits of small-scale fishery cooperatives, and 
attributes of success or failure not included in Table 1. (N.R.= not reported). 
 
Cooperative Benefits/Costs Attributes 
 
 
Cooperatives of the Regional 
Federation of Cooperative 
Societies of Baja California, 
Mexico (FEDECOOP) (Pérez 
Ramírez et al., 2012) 
Ecol: Regulations to protect 
fish recruitment. 
 
Soc: Community 
empowerment (autonomy in 
decision-making). 
 
Econ: Ability to negotiate 
prices. 
Fishery concessions (exclusive 
territorial access rights). 
 
Compliance and self-
enforcement of scientifically-
based total allowable catch. 
Abalone fishermen in 
southeastern Australia 
(Gilmour et al., 2011) 
Ecol: When fishermen 
perceived declines in stock 
abundance, they cooperated 
within their fishermen 
associations to design rules to 
protect depleted fishing areas. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: N.R. 
In addition to secure fishing 
rights in the form of individual 
fishing quotas and high levels 
of trust between fishermen, 
rules for resource management 
appeared only when there was 
a common perception that 
fishing areas are 
overexploited. 
Cooperatives in the Turkish 
Aegean (Ünal et al., 2011) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: Educational 
opportunities. 
 
Econ: Credit opportunities, 
profit sharing, marketing 
facilities, auctioning services, 
discounted input prices.  
Government assistance was 
provided to maintain 
cooperative services, such as 
credit opportunities, to its 
members during times of 
economic hardship.  
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Commercial divers of Puerto 
Peñasco, Gulf of California, 
Mexico  (Cudney-Bueno and 
Basurto, 2009) 
Ecol: Increase in local 
resource abundance. 
 
Soc: Increase in social ties. 
 
Econ: Increase in fishermen 
profits. 
Stakeholder participation in 
monitoring was crucial for the 
emergence of cooperation. 
  
Lack of formally-recognized 
exclusive territorial access 
rights led to the demise of 
cooperation. Strong 
community ties became a 
negative factor, as it led to 
resource overexploitation by 
cooperative members as a 
means of preventing fishing 
by outside fishermen.  
Seri Indian fishing 
cooperative, Gulf of 
California, Mexico (Basurto, 
2008) 
Ecol: Protection of buffer 
areas (seagrass meadows). 
 
Soc: Ability to remain in the 
fishery by negotiating 
resource prices and 
collectively harvesting 
resources commanding high 
prices. 
 
Econ: Ability to maintain a 
regular income from the 
fishery. 
Cooperatives had exclusive 
territorial access rights. 
 
Local knowledge on 
sustainable resource-
harvesting practices 
(minimum sizes, closure of 
buffer areas) was used to 
inform management. 
Tilefish fishermen of 
Montauk, New York State 
(Kitts et al., 2007) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: Ability of fishermen to 
participate in fishery 
management plans. Improved 
fishing-safety conditions.  
 
Econ: Higher and steadier 
income flow. 
A quota share was assigned to 
the cooperative.  
 
Lobster and conch 
cooperatives in Belize (Huitric 
2005) 
Ecol: Overexploitation of 
lobster and conch suggested 
by a decrease in catch per unit 
effort since the establishment 
of the cooperatives. 
 
Soc: Some fishermen have 
benefited from export markets, 
and their increased income has 
allowed them to pay for the 
The establishment of fishery 
cooperatives gave fishermen 
access to export markets, 
credit, and new technologies, 
but resulted in 
overexploitation because there 
were inadequate regulations 
for resource use. 
 
The open-access nature of the 
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schooling of their children. A 
large number of fishermen 
became indebted and could 
not repay their loans. 
 
Econ: A general decrease in 
fishermen’s income. 
fisheries did not create 
incentives for cooperatives to 
manage the resources for 
sustainability. 
Fishing cooperatives in Capiz 
Province, The Philippines 
(Baticados, 2004) 
Ecol: Increased resource 
abundance with community-
based management. 
 
Soc: Tenurial rights were 
granted to cooperatives. 
Increased ability to influence 
government policies on 
coastal management. 
 
Econ: Possibility of obtaining 
credit. Increased fishery 
catches. 
 
 
The participation of fishermen 
in coastal resource 
management through their 
cooperative was positively 
influenced by a perceived 
likelihood of a threat to their 
livelihood; an awareness of 
coastal conservation 
programs; the support 
received from the government 
in controlling illegal fishing; 
and the number of children 
that fishermen had. 
Cooperatives procured 
exclusive-use rights to fishing 
grounds.  
Sockeye salmon fishermen 
cooperative in Chignik, 
Alaska (Kitts and Edwards, 
2003; Deacon et al., 2008)2,3 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc:N.R. 
 
Econ: Members of the 
cooperative created a profit 
sharing agreement that 
substantially reduces the 
number of boats and the 
fishing costs.   
The cooperative was assigned 
a portion of the total catch, 
which enabled a profit-sharing 
agreement.  
Fishermen of Toyama Bay, 
Japan (Gaspart and Seki, 
2003) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: Cooperatives have 
allowed fishermen to gain the 
right to expand their fishing 
areas.  
 
Econ: N.R. 
 
 
In Japan, coastal communities 
have exclusive rights over 
adjacent waters. A successful 
profit-sharing arrangement 
occurred even when fishermen 
had varying degrees of fishing 
skills because of social norms 
that engendered pride in being 
the best fishermen.  
Fishing communities in Ecol: Revival of the A resurgence of community-
                                                             
2 Large-scale fishery, as defined above. 
3 This cooperative ultimately failed due to legal challenges. 
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Vanuatu, Samoa, Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Palau, Hawaii, 
and Tuvalu (Johannes, 2002) 
application of traditional 
practices for sustainable 
resource use. 
 
Soc: Resurgence of pride in 
traditional resource 
management practices. 
 
Econ: Increased income from 
marine-related tourism. 
based management of fishery 
resources was attributed to a 
growing scarcity of resources, 
the independence of some of 
the islands from former 
colonial powers that imposed 
“Western” management 
regimes, and a strengthening 
of the right of communities to 
control access to their 
traditional fishing grounds. 
Fishermen association of 
Malalison Island, The 
Philippines  (Baticados and 
Agbayani, 2000) 
Ecol: Visual census and 
fishermen’s perceptions 
suggest an increase in juvenile 
fish in a fish sanctuary created 
by the fishermen association. 
 
Soc: Through membership in 
the association, fishermen 
gained power in advocating 
for changes in fishery 
management. 
 
Econ: N.R.  
The fishermen association was 
successful in gaining 
territorial use rights over a 
small area. 
 
The success of the fishermen 
association depended in part 
on enforcement assistance 
provided by the local 
government. 
Fishermen in Fijian traditional 
fishing grounds (Cooke et al., 
2000) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: N.R. 
The strength of leadership of 
local rulers was seen as 
essential for the success of 
traditional cooperative fishing 
schemes. Traditional fishing 
grounds were divided among 
clans. 
U.S. Pacific Northwest and 
Fishing companies in the 
Alaska groundfish fisheries 
(Sullivan, 2000)4 
Ecol: The creation of quota-
sharing cooperatives resulted 
in the elimination of the race 
to fish and the scattering of 
fishing to larger areas, 
reducing the risk of localized 
depletion of pollock stocks. 
 
Soc: Increased ability of 
fishermen to negotiate quota 
shares. 
 
Econ: N.R. 
When barriers to entry were 
created and eliminated open 
access, fishermen recognized 
the benefits of creating 
cooperatives that received a 
share of the quota. 
                                                             
4 Large-scale fishery, as defined above. 
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Fishermen of Big Creek 
Ecological Reserve, California 
(Pomeroy and Beck, 1999) 
Ecol: An informal cooperative 
agreement by fishermen led to 
a rotation of fishing grounds 
to reduce pressure on 
resources, and the 
establishment of a no-take 
zone. 
 
Soc: Cooperation increased 
safety, as fishermen helped 
each other with launching and 
landing their boats during bad 
weather. Fishermen also 
shared fishing data. 
 
Econ: N.R. 
 
The close personal 
relationship between the 
reserve manager and the 
fishermen was conducive to 
cooperation. However, 
increased pressure on fishery 
resources due to the lack of 
barriers to entry was a threat 
to the cooperative 
arrangement. 
Lobster fishermen of Caye 
Caulker, Belize (King, 1997) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: Long-term stable yields 
of lobster. 
The traditional management 
system allocated territories to 
fishermen. An absence of a 
conservation objective is a 
threat to the lobster stock.  
Coastal fishermen in 
Hokkaido, Japan  (Barrett and 
Okudaira, 1995) 
Ecol: In Japan, yields of many 
coastal resources have been 
maintained in time. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: In Japan, the average 
income of coastal fishermen 
has grown steadily. 
By placing conservation as an 
explicit goal, Japanese fishing 
cooperatives have maintained 
stable yields of coastal 
resources. 
 
Coastal communities have 
exclusive rights over adjacent 
waters. 
 
Competition for resources 
between fishing cooperatives 
in Hokkaido led to severe 
emigration of affected 
fishermen.  
Users of mangrove resources 
in St. Lucia (Smith and 
Berkes, 1993)  
Ecol: Density of mangrove 
shoots increased with 
cooperative management. 
 
Soc: Sustainable management 
of mangrove trees that provide 
fuelwood to local 
communities. 
Elimination of open-access 
conditions increased interest 
in the formation of a 
cooperative for the extraction 
of mangrove. 
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Econ: N.R. 
Fishery cooperatives in 
socialist Poland (Jentoft and 
Marciniak, 1991) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: N.R. 
The National Union of Fishery 
Cooperatives (NUFC) was 
crucial to the success of its 
member cooperatives. It 
represented cooperatives in 
the negotiation of the Polish 
national quota, and 
administered the allocation of 
quota shares among 
cooperatives. Individual 
cooperatives had the 
obligation to allocate their 
quota internally and to enforce 
fishing regulations. In one of 
the co-ops, an annual lottery 
system was used to allocate 
fishing areas to individual 
fishermen. 
 
On behalf of the cooperatives, 
the NUFC also negotiated fish 
prices with the government, 
imported fishing equipment, 
and provided endorsements 
for cooperatives seeking bank 
credits  
 
The cooperatives agreed 
informally to fish only in areas 
designated to each. 
Fishery cooperative in 
socialist Bulgaria (Marciniak 
and Jentoft, 1992) 
Ecol: N.R. 
 
Soc: N.R. 
 
Econ: With the establishment 
of the cooperative, fishermen 
gained power to set prices and 
to demand prompt payments. 
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Discussion 
 
Studies of fishery cooperatives since Pollnac’s review (1988) confirm that cooperation in 
fishing can generate many conservation and socioeconomic benefits, including some that 
transcend the original goals of cooperating. For example, fishermen can decide to cooperate to 
reduce costs and maximize revenues, but a fishing cooperative set up for that purpose can bring 
one or more of the following types of benefits:  
 
(i) Producer benefits (e.g., reduced search time due to information sharing; reduced 
input costs by buying in bulk; access to financing of infrastructure). 
 
(ii) Market benefits (e.g., reduced costs for market access; increased market power 
which changes the relationship with buyers; easier access to new markets). 
 
(iii) Management benefits (e.g., reduced transaction costs of agreements and decision 
making; quick and appropriate sanctions). 
 
(iv) Conservation benefits (e.g., lower by-catch due to information sharing; higher 
compliance with catch limits and other conservation targets; joint monitoring of 
protected areas; sustainable yields). 
 
(v) Social benefits (e.g., community empowerment, job retention, maintenance of 
fishing culture, new educational opportunities, increased safety in fishing activities, 
increase in social ties). 
 
Fishing cooperatives address problems of resource use in a variety of ways (Ovando et 
al., 2013), but there appear to be a limited number of factors that predict the success or failure of 
cooperatives in achieving their goals. Besides the factors that have been known to contribute to 
success for many years (Table 1), secure fishing rights seem to be an important precursor to the 
success of actions aimed at increasing sustainability (Ovando et al. 2013). However, for 
cooperation that is durable and successful over time, secure fishing rights have to be 
accompanied by skillful management (Jentoft et al., 1998). For their part, good management 
skills can only be fully utilized when institutional arrangements ensure that the decisions of local 
managers will be respected at higher levels of administration (Jentoft, 2005).   
The emergence of cooperation to achieve common goals in fisheries does not always 
occur with the purpose of sustaining the resource. As discussed above, when strong social ties 
that facilitate cooperation are present, but resource use occurs without limited and secure access, 
cooperation can actually lead to overexploitation. Examples are the cooperative of commercial 
divers in Puerto Peñasco, Mexico, as well as lobster and conch cooperatives in Belize, where 
access to new markets, credit, and new technologies, combined with inadequate regulations for 
resource use, resulted in excessive resource extraction (Table 2). Other challenges to durable 
cooperation include the imposition of rules from outside agents; difficulties in the formation of 
capital to sustain the cooperatives; conflicts of interest between cooperative members; the need 
to address multiple problems faced by a fishery; and the need to count on efficient management 
from members of the fishing community (Jentoft, 1986). The establishment of secure fishing 
rights faces challenges of its own (see Bonzon et al., 2010), such as developing a system for 
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share allocation that receives wide support by fishermen and cooperatives that participate in 
catch-share programs. Overcoming all of these challenges demands a change in the top-down 
approach prevalent in many fisheries worldwide, and, although this may not require a complete 
restructuring of current governance and institutional structures, even modest modifications can 
take considerable time (Noble, 2000). Given the current state of the world’s fisheries and the 
urgent need for solutions, pursuing strategies to encourage the replication of successful 
experiences in cooperation warrants particular attention.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Because the combined list of success attributes from Pollnac (1988) and from the present 
review is long, we have summarized them into the following cooperative design guidance:  
 
Cooperative origins:  Local initiatives, including an early investment by fishermen of labor or 
capital, should be based wherever possible on traditional institutions.  Cooperative research and 
monitoring can be crucial for the emergence of cooperation.  A perceived common threat or 
common benefit can serve to galvanize cooperation. 
 
Enabling conditions:  Local initiatives should be supported by streamlined laws and 
bureaucracies that facilitate or at least avoid impairing the success of cooperatives.  Strong 
leadership and high levels of social capital also appear to be important for cooperative success.  
Cooperatives should hold property rights or secure fishing privileges.  Support for reducing 
illegal fishing can enhance cooperative success and overall sustainability.  
 
Membership: Members should be closely tied to the fishery, have similar goals and values, and 
be willing and able to participate.   
 
Administration: Some members should be trained in management and administration. 
 
Capital: Fishermen should contribute labor and capital, and the cooperative should have access to 
other sources of capital; however, a financial dependence on subsidies should be avoided. 
 
Compliance: Cooperatives should impose measures such as positive incentives, profit-sharing, 
and penalties that enhance compliance with rules. 
 
Science-based goals: Cooperatives should hold themselves accountable (or held accountable by 
other entities) to science-based conservation goals and socioeconomic goals.  Local knowledge 
should be used to enhance scientific understanding of stock status and the articulation of 
appropriate conservation and management goals. 
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